INTRODUCTION
Most individuals do not have the inclination, knowledge, or time to rely directly upon the companies in which they have interests for and should interact with their clients. But the exact scope of brokerdealers' legal obligations toward investors remains the subject of much debate. There has been pressure for increased federal regulation to govern the conduct of broker-dealers because it is unclear whether an effective regulatory system can rest on the application of such broad-based and well-established securities regulations as Rule 10b-5, 5 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act. 6 In particular, courts and commentators disagree over when the relationship between broker-dealers and investors is fiduciary in nature under federal or state law and thus when broker-dealers have well-defined duties toward investors. 7 This Article is the first to analyze the emotional, psychological, and moral consequences of the answers to the questions of when and to what extent broker-dealers are and should be treated as fiduciaries of their clients. Recently, a law and economics scholar normatively evaluated the regulation of securities professionals." His analysis was premised on an economic theory of asymmetric information that does not involve any emotions:' In particular, the article did not analyze whether imposing a fiduciary duty of loyalty triggers guilt on the part of securities professionals.
This Article analyzes the interaction between expectations about the behavior of securities professionals and securities professionals' this disagreement and providing supporting references); Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1247 REV. , 1279 REV. -83 (1983 (considering the extent to which Rule lOb-5 should apply to "the full range of activities of securities professionals," and reviewing court opinions which have or have not held brokers to a fiduciary standard depending upon the underlying conduct); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 675-80 (1996) (introducing the questions that inform this debate and suggesting in which situations a fiduciary relationship may or may not be appropriate between brokers and clients). REV. 630, 658-62 & n.69 (1979) (discussing a taxonomy of goods-namely "search" goods versus "experience" goodsbased on the information available about them, originally described by Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970) ); see also Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973) (introducing "credence" goods as a third class of goods in the taxonomy described by Nelson). [Vol. 151:1059 emotions. It considers whether guilt can motivate securities professionals' decisions and the legal implications of guilt for the regulation of securities professionals. The basic notion is that guilt provides an internal mechanism for legal compliance.' 0 In other words, guilt provides a multiplier deterrence effect beyond the external mechanisms for legal compliance provided by private litigation, public enforcement, and sanctions. This Article applies the analytical tool of psychological game theory to analyze the interaction between the legal responsibilities of securities professionals toward their clients and the behavioral norms of securities professionals. It concludes that securities law can foster particular behavioral norms and that choosing rules designed to increase the guilt of broker-dealers can foster trust and trustworthy behavior."
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This Article focuses on broker-dealers, but its analysis applies more generally to such other financial actors as securities analysts, boards of directors, corporate officers, and managers. The analysis in this Article is based on formal models of trust and so applies to any relationship involving trust. The recent wave of highly publicized corporate and accounting scandals reinforces the importance of investors' trust for well-functioning capital and securities markets." But An economic definition of Fs being a fiduciary of P is that P's consumption, utility, or wealth must enter into Fs utility function at least on a par with Fs own consumption, utility, or wealth. F breaches Fs fiduciary duty if P's consumption, utility, or wealth does not enter into Fs utility function or does so, but only below Fs own consumption, utility, or wealth. Finding a fiduciary relationship between investors and broker-dealers implies that broker-dealers owe investors a duty of fair dealing. The existing discourse on the question of when broker-dealers are fiduciaries focuses on the legal consequences of the answer to that question. But in the oft-quoted words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, "to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins [the] analy-
Once a court determines that particular corporate actors are fiduciaries, the legal, cognitive psychological, moral, and emotional sanctions of such a finding are strengthened by clarifying the precise nature of the duty of loyalty that is involved.
7 For example, some lawyers and commentators have argued that securities analysts at investment banks who make "buy" recommendations for securities to the public owe a fiduciary duty to disclose the role their employers play in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of those securities. tensions of Part II, including the roles of guilt and pride in employee investing.
I. REGULATION OF BROKER-DEALERS
Many securities firms are brokers and dealers as those terms are defined in the Securities Exchange Act. Section 3 (a) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act defines a broker to be "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others." 1 4 Section 3(a) (5) defines a dealer to be "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account., The SEC has the authority to hold administrative hearings to discipline broker-dealers.
In addition, the national securities exchanges and registered securities associations, such as the NASD, have the power and responsibility to discipline their member firms." These self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have disciplinary authority over not only their own rules, but also federal securities laws and rules promulgated by the SEC. For example, the NASD has adopted regulations intended to promote just and equitable trade principles. 2476 (1996) , states that the NYSE may discipline a member, member organization, allied member, or person otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the exchange who is adjudged guilty of, among other things, violating the Exchange Act, the NYSE constitution or rules, or any agreements with the NYSE; "fraud or fraudulent acts"; or "conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade."
tions it deems "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."" The SEC regulates margin requirements for extending credit to investors, 41 the borrowing and hypothecation of securities, 44 the trading of securities by broker-dealers for their own accounts,' ' and the keeping of books, records, and reports by broker-dealers." C ' As this list makes clear, the SEC has the power under various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act to regulate specific aspects of the broker-dealer business. It does not, however, have general authority to regulate broker-dealers' handling of their customers' accounts.
Because the Securities Exchange Act does not provide the SEC with general authority to regulate the conduct of broker-dealers, the SEC applies antifraud statutory provisions to regulate broker-dealer conduct. The SEC has promulgated a number of rules concerning disclosure, fraud, and manipulation 4 7 under the general antifraud provision for broker-dealers, section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act. 4 The SEC has derived even more authority under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act. 49 For example, Rule 10b-10 requires that broker-dealers "disclose specified information ... to customers at or before completion of a transaction and that they send customers a bill or confirmation of their purchase of a security. More generally, Rule lOb-3 prohibits deceptive or manipulative acts, courses of business, or practices by brokers or dealers." Most generally, Rule 1Ob-5 prohibits the use of deceptive or manipulative devices by any person "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Despite its broad scope, Rule IOb-5 does not address all forms of deceitful securities behavior. Rule lOb-5 applies if a broker lies to a customer in order to generate commissions from a fraudulently induced purchase or sale of a security. Unfortunately, broker-dealer misconduct often takes on more subtle forms of deceit than outright lies. More often, a broker or dealer takes informational advantage of its customers' deference and trust. For example, in a recent Supreme Court case, a broker made personal use of the proceeds from selling the securities in the discretionary account of an elderly man and his mentally retarded daughter.
The scope of Rule lOb-5 in dealing with misconduct by brokers and dealers has expanded to address these concerns in two ways. The first and more traditional approach is deciding that a fiduciary relationship exists between a broker-dealer and her customers. In such a case, the broker-dealer owes her clients fiduciary duties and obligations. For example, in dicta in SEC v. Zandford, Justice Stevens stated regarding the "in connection with" requirement of Rule 10b-5 that "any distinction between omissions and misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients. There is also widespread consensus that broker-dealers owe their clients a duty of best execution for securities transactions.
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Courts disagree, however, over the circumstances under which the relationship between broker-dealers and their clients is a fiduciary one.
5 7 Some courts presume that broker-dealers are not fiduciaries of their clients.5 8 Other courts presume that broker-dealers are fiduciar- REv. 1077 REv. , 1084 REv. (1977 (investigating the SEC disclosure policy and the protection it provides for investors). 54 SECv. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899 , 1901 ies even of sophisticated clients.' Many courts take a middle position and engage in ad hoc detailed and unpredictable inquiries as to the nature of the relationship between broker-dealers and their clients, focusing often on the level of broker discretion over the account in question.
6
" Thus, the common law does not provide a uniform set of rules or even standards from which broker-dealers can infer the obligations they owe their clients or even whether a fiduciary relationship exists.
Two former SEC Commissioners, Edward Fleischman and Joseph A. Grundfest, also questioned whether broker-dealers have a broad fiduciary obligation to deal fairly with their customers. In one case in which the SEC ruled that securities firms must give priority to their customers' limit orders before they execute trades for their own accounts as a matter of simple fiduciary obligation, Commissioners Fleischman and Grundfest dissented from the majority's broad fiduciary analysis."' The two Commissioners would have required further proceedings designed to determine a reasonable customer's expectations about her broker's role, given the multiple conflicting roles that securities firms have had-visibly and for a long time-in securities markets and the existing trade practices of securities firms.
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These Commissioners noted that broker-dealers engage in arbitrage, corporate finance, and market making in addition to executing their customers' orders and providing advice or information. Thus, they ar- gued it would be reasonable for customers not to expect their brokers to be fiduciaries. The second and less traditional approach to the obligations that broker-dealers have toward their clients is the so-called shingle theory. The shingle theory presumes that being a broker-dealer involves hanging out a shingle to solicit customers. 65 The shingle, then, makes an implicit representation of fair dealing to those clients. 66 Courts rely on both the federal securities laws and securities industry standards of fair dealing when utilizing the shingle theory to analyze broker-dealer conduct.
7 According to the courts, breaching a duty of fair dealing is fraudulent because it involves breaching the implied representation of fair dealing. The existence of a fraud allegation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security also brings the conduct within section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. As a result, both the SEC and private plaintiffs can pursue the broker-dealer. 6 An example of an actionable fraud is the practice of excessive securities trading or turnover, referred to as churning." "Churning occurs when a securities broker buys and sells securities for a customer's account, without regard to the customer's investment interests, for the purpose of generating commissions."
76 Another judicial definition of churning focuses on "when a broker, exercising control over the frequency and volume of trading in the customer's account, initiates transactions that are excessive in view of the character of the ac- 64 To define trading as excessive, some courts examine a quantitative measure known as the Annualized Turnover Ratio (ATR) of a portfolio.
7 ' The ATR of a portfolio is defined as its total cost of securities purchases over a year divided by the amount invested in the portfolio. 4 An ATR value of 2 means that a portfolio's turnover is "proportion [all to buying and selling twice the value of [that] portfolio during a year.
A common rule of thumb is that an ATR value of 2 is considered possible evidence of churning, an ATR value of 4 creates a presumption of churning, and an ATR value of 6 is generally conclusive of churning. In addition to the above ATR heuristics, courts also examine the volume of commissions as a percentage of the broker's income, the branch's revenues, or comparable accounts other brokers handle . Finally, certain patterns of securities trading by a broker may be deemed to be churning even if they involve a low volume of trade. These suspicious patterns include cross trading, defined as transfers of securities among similar customer accounts of a broker; in-and-out trading, defined as securities purchases followed almost immediately by securities resales; and switching, defined as replacing a security with one with similar characteristics.
80
In addition to applying the shingle theory against brokers who have recommended securities that are unsuitable for their customers, courts use the suitability doctrine to regulate broker-dealer conduct under section 10(b). 81 Suitability refers to the grades of, diversification of, liquidity of, and trading techniques for securities.
2 The viability of a section 10(b) unsuitability claim was recognized in a case involving a recently retired woman who wanted a yield of $1000 per month from a principal of $100,000 that she desired to invest from a divorce settlement. UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWRJEVIEW [Vol. 151:1059 she been told of the risk required to achieve her desired yield, she would not have purchased the debentures. The court upheld her claim. According to the NASD, which oversees the nation's largest securities arbitration forums, in 2002 there were 2644 cases in which customers claimed their brokers recommended unsuitable investments.
8
" This figure is seventy-three percent higher than in 2001. A final example of securities fraud under the shingle theory arises from allegations of brokers charging their clients excessive price markups.
8 " The case that gave birth to the shingle theory held that it was fraudulent for a broker-dealer to charge prices sixteen to forty-86 one percent above prevailing market prices. The holding rested on the theory that when a broker-dealer charges its customers excessive prices, it violates an implied obligation to obtain the best possible price for its customers.
7
One commentator has argued that the shingle theory's presumption that broker-dealers make an implied representation that they will deal fairly with their clients is, ultimately, a legal fiction.
8 She observed that the development of the shingle theory falls to the SEC and SROs through their disciplinary proceedings instead of the courts because "most cases between broker-dealers and customers now are relegated to arbitration." 8 " The impact on the shingle theory of the Supreme Court's decision in 1987 to uphold the validity of predispute agreements to arbitrate disputes under federal securities laws remains unclear." What is clear, though, is that the privatization of disputes between broker-dealers and their customers means that deterrence of broker-dealers' misconduct may have to rely more on internal moral and psychological sanctions than on external legal sanctions.
The above overview demonstrates that the extent, if any, of a broker-dealer obligation of fair dealing remains in dispute. Both princi- In contrast, corporate law does not prohibit self-dealing. Instead, it raises the level of judicial review of self-interested transactions by managers under a fairness test. Delaware corporate fiduciary duty law can be understood "as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad managers and directors, tales that collectively describe their normative role." 9 7 This normative view of Delaware corporate fiduciary law implies thinking "ofjudges more as preachers than as policemen."
9' The judges' opinions can be thought of as 'judicial sermons that exhort managers to consummate performance and that criticize those who perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps especially when, no direct legal sanction is imposed."
99 Delaware courts help develop and transmit legally unenforceable rules about corporate behavior.
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They do so both via the imposition of legal sanctions and through "the development or internalization of appropriate modes of behavior, coupled with the withering denunciations of self-dealing that courts are capable of delivering."'' 1 Such a theory of Delaware corporate law builds on work focusing on judicial storytelling in the law-andnarrative literature.'° This normative approach to Delaware corporate law cases is similar to the use of the common law to understand norms of secrecy.1' 86-108 (1988) (proposing a theory of interpretation that focuses on the legal construction of precedent and its judicial application to facts in order to better understand the interpretive nature of law).
The game tree in Figure 1 is a simplification of the game tree in Figure This game also modifies David Kreps's game of trust.
In the game tree depicted in Figure 1 , an investor can decide not to hire a brokerdealer and the status quo payoffs are normalized to be $0 for both players. Alternatively, the investor can hire the broker-dealer and make an investment of $I, which can have an expected gross return of $R If the broker-dealer does not misbehave, then the broker-dealer earns a fee of $F The investor earns an expected net return of $N, where N = R -I -F. Alternatively, there is an endogenous probability of the broker-dealer's choosing to falsely report the results of the investment, to churn the investor's portfolio, or to misbehave in some other manner. In such a case, the investor receives only a low return of $L. The broker-dealer, however, enjoys material gains of $A. If F > A, then broker-dealers do not misbehave if hired and so investors hire broker-dealers. Suppose that F < A. Then, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium 0 6 of this game involves the broker-dealer's misbehaving if hired, and so the investor's not hiring the broker-dealer. In other words, neither player has a unilateral incentive to deviate from her strategy choice. The subgame-perfect restriction essentially rules out behavior that is not consistent over time.
But in reality, investors do hire broker-dealers to make investments. The neoclassical view is that deterrence in the form of expected fines, penalties, or sanctions provides broker-dealers with the incentives to behave properly. This approach is depicted in Figure 2 . The payoff to risk-neutral broker-dealers from misbehaving is A -E, where E denotes the expected punishment from such misbehavior. The variable E is the result of multiplying the probability of punishment by the magnitude of punishment. 
broker chooses not to misbehave. Thefirst number in each pair is the investor's payoff and the second number in each pair is the broker's payoff
Depending on the size of E, this new game has the following possible equilibrium outcomes: If E < A -F, the only equilibrium is that of the game in Figure 1 where an investor does not hire the brokerdealer who would misbehave if hired. If E > A -J, the only equilib-rium is a new one where the investor hires the broker-dealer who does not misbehave because E, the expected punishment, outweighs the monetary gain of misbehaving. If E = A -F, there is an infinite number of equilibrium outcomes in which the broker-dealer is indifferent between misbehaving or not.
1 0 7 For example, if the gains from misbehavior are particularly large, (that is, if A is large), we are back to the unique equilibrium of Figure 1 . If E is small because the probability of punishment or the magnitude of punishment (or both) is small, then we return to the unique equilibrium of Figure 1 . Factually, there are reasons to expect A to be large or E to be small in many securities cases involving broker-dealers. Increasing E, by increasing the level of enforcement or the degree of punishment, is thus one way to increase deterrence in the neoclassical model. The models below demonstrate that another way to increase deterrence is to find a fiduciary duty. In addition, to achieve a given level of deterrence, the degree of punishment or the level of enforcement need not be increased as much as in the neoclassical model when increasing the degree of punishment or the level of enforcement has psychological or moral deterrence effects.
A second, oft-cited reason that investors hire broker-dealers is that investors believe the value of broker-dealers' reputations motivate them to avoid misbehaving. This belief is premised on the existence of market forces that discipline, if not prevent, broker-dealers' misbehavior. For example, in the long run, a broker-dealer depends on ongoing relationships for commissions. Game theory describes these relationships as being between repeat players.
Such repeat play considerations do not exist if the broker-dealer is in the "last period" or suffers from the "endgame problem," as she likely will if she is about to misappropriate a particularly large sum of money.
Emotional preferences can reduce misbehavior even if the brokerdealer relationship has just one period remaining. So emotional preferences differ from the above reputation story, but emotions and reputation are not mutually exclusive. In a sense, emotions complete the reputation story because reputations may relate to whether a broker-dealer is a good type who feels guilt from misbehaving or a bad type who does not. This account of emotional preferences as private information that can be signaled provides an alternative to Eric Posner's work on signaling discount rates.'08 A broker-dealer who feels guilt from engaging in misbehavior is captured by the game tree in Figure 3 . The payoffs in Figure 3 differ from those in Figure 1 according to the broker-dealer's level of guilt for engaging in misbehavior. Instead of receiving $A, an emotional broker-dealer has a total payoff of $ (A -G) , where G is the monetary equivalent of guilt, or A -G, where both A and G express the brokerdealer's utility. Depending on the size of G, this new game has the following equilibria: If G < A -F, the only equilibrium is the one in the game in Figure 1 , where the investor does not hire a misappropriating broker-dealer. If G > A -F, the only equilibrium is a new one where the investor hires the broker-dealer who does not misbehave because the resulting guilt swamps the monetary gain of misbehaving. If G = A -Fi, there is an infinite number of equilibrium outcomes in which the broker-dealer is indifferent between misbehaving or not and any probability mixture of those strategies."
Thus, adding guilt can change the equilibrium outcome of the investing game. (2000) (discussing the signaling of "good" and "bad" types' discount rates).
10 Compare these outcomes with those stated for Figure 2 , supra note 107.
The game in Figure 4 combines the games in Figures 2 and 3 by analyzing broker-dealers who face both external sanctions and internal guilt from misbehaving. But the games in Figures 3 and 4 beg the questions of what determines how much guilt a broker-dealer feels and from what that guilt originates. People's propensities to feel guilt vary based upon such demographic variables as their age, culture, ethnicity, gender, upbringing, norms, and other unobservable differences. It is also unclear whether broker-dealers feel guilt because of a fear of getting caught breaking the law or morally disappointing their clients. Guilt derived from a fear of getting caught breaking the law is instrumental, while guilt based on clients' moral disappointment is intrinsic or ethical. The first sort of guilt is also closely related to the shame or public humiliation of being caught breaking the law. 110 The game depicted in Figure 5 focuses on the moral disappointment aspect of guilt. It also provides a model of guilt that partly depends on expectations about the behavior of broker-dealers. A broker-dealer's payoffs are motivated by the notion that the broker-dealer cares more about being loyal the more she expects that clients expect loyalty. 
r = broker's expectation of investor's expectation over p. The first number in each pair is the investor's payoff and the second number in each pair is the brokers payoff
Psychological games provide analytical models for a particular category of emotions, namely emotions that depend on expectations about strategic behavior."' Psychological game theory offers a formal mathematical apparatus for studying interactive situations in which at least one individual's utility is a function notjust of strategic decisions, but also of some other individual's expectations over (possibly another individual's expectations over, and so forth) strategy choices." 2 Fear and hope are two emotions that by their very nature depend on an individual's expectations for the future. Often, such expectations are related to, or depend on, the strategic decisions of another individual. For example, second marriages are often said to involve "the triumph of hope over experience."
Psychological game theory may be applied to a variety of phenomena.
One economist has formulated psychological gametheoretic models of pricing and employment practices to explain why firms neither always charge monopoly prices when they can nor behave toward workers as neoclassical labor economics predicts."
'' An- REV. 1281 REV. , 1284 REV. -90, 1292 REV. -96 (1993 (constructing strategic-form psychological other economist has constructed psychological games of gift giving involving such expectation-dependent emotions as disappointment, embarrassment, surprise, and pride.
' 4 Such models have implications for industrial relations, giving holiday gifts, and tipping service providers."' There are several psychological game-theoretic models of legal interactions."' Suppose that an investor and a broker-dealer are playing the modified securities investment game depicted in Figure 5 .'7 The variable p denotes the endogenous probability that a particular brokerdealer will not abuse an investor's trust. Let q denote that investor's expectation of the variable p. In other words, q is the mean of the investor's subjective distribution over the probability p. Let r denote the broker-dealer's expectation of q. The variable r is an example of what is known as a second-order expectation, while the variable q is an example of what is known as a first-order expectation."" For simplicity, assume that psychological guilt is a multiple M times r, the brokerdealer's expectations over the investor's expectations over the probability that the broker-dealer will not abuse trust if entrusted. The assumption that part of a broker-dealer's guilt from misappropriation depends on the size of r captures the idea that guilt includes a psychogames involving fairness to study the prices that monopolists actually charge and the personnel policies that firms actually employ the fear of losing face induces compliance with international environmental law); Huang, supra note 110 (analyzing emotions in bargaining over property rights); Huang & Wu, supra note 31 (studying the role that guilt can play in sustaining the honoring of trust in principal-agent relationships). 17 This game is akin to the psychological game of trust in Figure 2 of Huang & Wu, supra note 31, at 394. The differences are the numerical payoff values and the interpretation of p here being the actual probability of not misbehaving by the brokerdealer, while p in the psychological game of trust is the proportion of a population of agents that choose not to abuse trust. 118 See Geanakoplos et al., supra note 111, at 70-78, for a discussion of higherorder expectations. [Vol. 151:1059 logical component. The assumption that psychological guilt depends linearly on the variable ris for analytical tractability. In order to fulfill the condition of rational expectations required by a psychological equilibrium, p = q = r in equilibrium. There are three psychological equilibrium outcomes." ' The first equilibrium involves the investor's choosing to hire the broker-dealer and p = q = r = I or the broker-dealer's choosing, with probability one, not to misbehave, with associated payoffs (N, F) . A second equilibrium involves the investor's choosing never to hire a broker-dealer and p = q = r = 0 or the broker-dealer's choosing to misbehave if given that opportunity. The associated payoffs are (0, 0). The third equilibrium involves the investor's choosing to hire the broker-dealer and
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The third and only completely mixed strategy equilibrium is found by setting the broker-dealer's payoffs from engaging in misbehavior and from not engaging in it equal-F = A -G -Mr-and setting p = r.
In the first equilibrium, the broker-dealer relationship occurs and the broker-dealer does not misbehave because she expects that the investor expects that the broker-dealer will not misbehave. If a brokerdealer were to misbehave, she would experience guilt to such a degree that she would prefer not to misbehave. In the second equilibrium, the broker-dealer relationship does not occur, and broker-dealers would misbehave if given the opportunity due to their expectations that investors expect such misbehavior and their consequent lack of guilt upon misbehaving. Alternatively, misbehavior can lead brokerdealers to feel guilt, but only to such a small degree that misbehaving still dominates not misbehaving. In the third equilibrium, the brokerdealer relationship occurs despite the fact that the broker-dealer misbehaves some fraction of the time because that still makes investors strictly better off than if they do not hire broker-dealers.
One can think of the three different equilibrium beliefs as reflecting the strength of a duty of loyalty for the broker-dealer relationship. The first equilibrium occurs when the duty of loyalty is strongest. The second equilibrium occurs when the duty of loyalty is weakest (nonexistent). The third equilibrium occurs when the duty of loyalty is in-19 A psychological equilibrium requires not only the usual Nash equilibrium property that players' strategies are best responses to each other, but also that players' expectations are correct in equilibrium. See Geanakoplos et al., sunva note 111, at 66, for the formal definition of a psychological equilibrium. termediate in strength. In contrast to the unique equilibrium for the original broker-dealer game without psychological payoffs in Figure 1 , the presence of psychological guilt makes possible multiple equilibrium outcomes-in particular, the first and third equilibrium outcomes. In these two equilibrium outcomes, the corresponding equilibrium expectations and psychological emotional payoffs support reduced misbehavior. This model, then, reveals that imposing a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers creates a perceived duty of loyalty and, by doing so, endogenously changes broker-dealers' and investors' expectations about broker-dealer behavior as well as broker-dealers' behavior itself. Those expectations, in turn, can form a self-enforcing equilibrium of behavior and expectations about behavior, should brokerdealers have the sort of preferences described above.
If broker-dealers are viewed as being legally subject to a fiduciary duty of loyalty, their preferences and hence their behavior can depend on their expectations about investors' expectations about broker-dealers' behavior. Broker-dealer preferences are endogenous because they depend on expectations, and those expectations are determined endogenously in equilibrium. When preferences are endogenous, law can influence broker-dealer preferences and brokerdealer behavior by selecting particular expectations as focal points.
This role that fiduciary law can play in securities law is analogous to the preference-shaping role of criminal law."" Criminal law may alter behavior not only by changing the cost of satisfying fixed preferences via fines and punishments, but also by dampening socially undesirable preferences themselves.
The endogenous nature of fiduciary preferences can mitigate the problem of misbehavior. Broker-dealers can be induced by their legal status as fiduciaries to have preferences that depend on their expectations of their clients' expectations about broker-dealers' behavior. This is true even if that fiduciary duty is not legally enforced or, more realistically, underenforced, at least in the short run. Some level of legal enforcement over time is required; otherwise, broker-dealers will come to expect that no en- forcement will occur. The power of fiduciary law is that it can harness emotions to comply with socially desirable norms of behavior.
The chief counsel in the SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations recently argued that moral aspirations played a sig-
nificant role in the genesis of U.S. federal regulation of securities. In the above models, fiduciary law provides deterrence not only via legal and monetary penalties, but also via expressive and symbolic roles that involve moral and emotional incentives. These roles are clearly related to expressive accounts of law. The above models demonstrate the expressive deterrence effect of finding a fiduciary duty on the part of securities professionals. Cass Sunstein focuses on how law may change the social meaning of particular actions.
1 2 3 Lawrence Lessig notes the variance in the social meanings of acts across time and cultures and how laws such as anti-dueling statutes in the southern United States may have provoked changes in the social meanings of dueling.
2 4 Dan Kahan considers how criminal law can deter crime via its social influence and social meaning. Punishments in Kahan's analysis also express a commu-
nity's moral condemnation. In Figure 5 , there is no such necessary relationship between the size or form of the punishment and guilt. In terms of the notation introduced earlier and utilized in Figure 5 , E, G, and M can be independent exogenous variables or G and/or M might depend on E, in particular the certainty of punishment, C, or the severity of punishment, S. In other words, if the expected punish- Tom Brown, a former Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ) banking analyst, stated that he decided in August 1998 that "it was worth more for my pride" to refuse $400,000 and the usual DLJ severance deal requiring him to keep quiet concerning analysts' practices."" There is also anecdotal evidence that professional securities traders react emotionally to financial decisions, information, and outcomes.1
39
Outside the securities context, there is evidence that monopolists do not always charge monopoly prices and that corporate personnel departments do not always behave as harshly as neoclassical labor-market models predict. 40 There is also experimental and empirical evidence that wanting to avoid guilt and stigma motivates tax compliance.1
'
135 See Cooter, supra note 133, at 1598-600 (pointing to one view that instead of treating the law as an external restraint, some judges use the law to "express their own political vision"); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697 , 1719 (1996 
A. Extensions
The analyses of the games in Figures 1 through 5 remain valid if, instead of feeling expectation-dependent guilt from breaching a duty of loyalty, broker-dealers feel expectation-dependent pride from honoring such a duty of loyalty. While guilt might be a form of negative utility or a cost in measuring social welfare, it must be offset by the anger or disappointment that investors experience if broker-dealers betray them. Thus, the fact that some broker-dealers may feel guilt does not necessarily imply that guilt should reduce compensatory damages. Pride from not breaching a duty of loyalty clearly is a positive utility or a benefit in assessing social welfare. 44 Two of the three outcomes involve no guilt being experienced in equilibrium. One of those outcomes would involve pride if, instead of experiencing guilt from breaching a fiduciary duty of loyalty, broker-dealers feel pride from complying with a fiduciary duty of loyalty. Only the mixed strategy equilibrium involves any actual experience of guilt from breaching fiduciary duties of loyalty. Replacing guilt with pride increases social welfare in the mixed strategy equilibrium. With either guilt or pride, greater-or higher-profile enforcement of and larger penalties 46 This variance means that broker-dealers will differ in how much expectation-dependent guilt they experience from breaching a fiduciary duty of loyalty. In an extreme case, a broker-dealer might not feel any guilt, but rather even a perverse sense of pleasure from exploiting a trusting and unsuspecting investor. There is certainly anecdotal evidence that such behavior exists.' For such broker-dealers, a fiduciary duty may crowd out whatever intrinsic morality the broker-dealer would otherwise have exhibited. Ample econometric and experimental evidence supports the conclusion that financial rewards and external regulations may crowd out intrinsic motivation. 1 ties markets where the absence of guilt can be financially rewarding. But if all broker-dealers were unscrupulous, investors would not hire any broker-dealers. This outcome is the second of the three psychological equilibria.
Any guilt that broker-dealers may experience from breaching fiduciary duties of loyalty might be offset by such other motivations as not disappointing the broker-dealers' colleagues, families, and supervisors. Whether broker-dealers feel guilt can also depend on how many of their peers engage in unfair or unscrupulous practices. In that case, herding, which occurs for other reasons among securities professionals, can reduce how much guilt broker-dealers experience from breaching a duty of loyalty and lead to a situation of "infectious greed.' 45 In fact, over time, some securities firms may screen for or train their broker-dealers to feel guilt from behavior that deviates from corporate norms. Those norms or explicit organizational rules may support being loyal to investors. But there may be other norms or unwritten rules that push in the opposite direction. There is anecdotal and ethnographic evidence of such norms.
5
The moral overload from these conflicting values can lead to efforts to relieve the moral dissonance, including casuistry, compartmentalization, escape, moral reconstruction, rationalization, and redemptive acts.' 15 Finally, replacing the assumption of rational expectations on the part of investors with the assumption of adaptive expectations by investors extends the analysis in Part 1. 152 In the models of Part II, investors rationally or correctly forecast broker-dealers' future behavior. If we assume instead that investors adaptively forecast broker-dealers' future behavior based on broker-dealers' past behavior, then we can extend the analysis in Part II to explain how investors may come to trust broker-dealers more and more over time as broker-dealers be- have well historically on average. But due to the lag in the adaptive expectations of investors, when broker-dealers misbehave, investors are caught off guard. Once broker-dealers misbehave, restoring trust by investors is difficult because of the lag in the adaptive expectations of investors. This cycle of expectations by investors and behavior by broker-dealers captures in essence the bull market of the 1990s and the more recent crisis in investor confidence.
B. An Application to Employee Investing
Guilt and pride may also cause employees to invest disproportionately in their employers' securities. Employees may feel guilty or disloyal to a company if they do not invest heavily in their employers' securities.
Alternatively, employees may invest heavily in their employers' securities because they feel pride in, or loyalty toward, that company. Pride also explains why some investors sell their winning stocks too quickly-namely to convert paper winnings into real onesbut do so at the expense of favorable tax treatment.'
5 Employers encourage their employees to invest in the employers' stock to enhance employee productivity and corporate performance.
If a company appears to be doing well financially or if employees like to believe in their companies' future prospects, then employees may have additional emotional reasons to invest heavily in their employers' stock: euphoria; exuberance; greed; and general feelings of positivity, wellbeing, or goodness.
' 5 ' 5 Such lack of adequate portfolio diversification can have ruinous consequences for employee-investors. Heavy investing by employees of their 401(k) plans in their employers' securities is very risky be- cause of insufficient portfolio diversification.' 5" Enron's bankruptcy and the resulting huge losses that Enron employees suffered from investing all or most of their 401 (k) plans in Enron stock is one highly publicized, recent example of this danger.
Enron employees who invested heavily in Enron's stock suffered substantial losses not only ex post, but also ex ante, because employee investors are exposed to firm-specific risk that could have been diversified away. In other words, holding company stock is inefficient for all employees, regardless of an employee's risk tolerance, because despite being exposed to higher risk, employee-investors earn precisely the same returns as fully diversified investors. Employee-investors value their companies' stock at less than its market value because of this imbalance.
Employees and companies would both be better off utilizing direct cash compensation instead of stock grants. A recent study found that employees sacrifice quite a lot by investing in their employers' stock relative to a well-diversified stock portfolio with the same level of risk. ' Under reasonable assumptions, these costs average 58% of the employers' stock market value.' s Thus, a 401(k) plan that has a market value of $1 million would be worth only $420,000 to an employee with an undiversified portfolio. " 15 9 Not only employees, but also their employers bear these costs of lack of diversification. Employers share in these costs because they are granting stock to employees instead of issuing it to fully diversified investors, who place a higher value on that stock.
For example, to grant an employee stock worth $42,000, a company must give that employee stock having a $100,000 market Recently proposed legislation addresses the problem of retirement portfolios' being too concentrated in employers' securities by amending Title I of ERISA. 1 6 3 These reforms can be seen as counterbalancing any guilt employees may experience from not investing heavily in their employers' securities (or, equivalently, counterbalancing any pride employees may experience from investing heavily in their employers' securities). The Pension Security Act of 2002 mandates periodic reports disclosing the plan sponsor's financial health.
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It also imposes diversification requirements for defined contribution plans that hold employer securities. 165 These diversification requirements mitigate any guilt employees might experience from not investing in their employers' securities.
The models in Part II of this Article explain how proposed legislative reforms in response to the Enron tragedy can alter norms about how much employees should be investing in their employers' securities. Thus, guilt affects different actors in securities investing and has different effects. It is socially desirable to encourage via fiduciary law a certain type of guilt by securities professionals and legally discourage another type of guilt by employee-investors.
CONCLUSION
Most investors lack the inclination, knowledge, and time to make their initial and subsequent investment decisions based directly upon the information that companies provide. Instead, investors typically base their investment decisions upon information filtered by securities professionals, such as brokers and dealers. Investors who manage their own investments, such as day traders, do so perhaps too actively and in ways that involve a different set of emotions than guilt."" Else-161 Id. 162 Id. Id. § 101. This Article has analyzed the relationship between investors and broker-dealers. In particular, the Article provided formal models explaining how fiduciary law can alter broker-dealers' expectations about investors' expectations about broker-dealers' behavior. These changed expectations can alter broker-dealers' expectationdependent guilt and behavior. During the great bull market of the 1990s, guilt and legal enforcement declined because investors earned very high net returns. Securities professionals could reject or ignore their feelings of guilt over cheating clients if, despite their brokerdealers' cheating, the clients were making lots of money and were happy about it. There was little pressure for vigorous legal enforcement because the securities markets experienced historical record highs. The recent string of highly publicized corporate and accounting scandals may usher in a new era with greater legal enforcement against,1 6 8 6 and higher levels of guilt experienced from, corporate malfeasance. 167 
